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The Cross-Section of Investing Skill
Ravindra Sastry
Building on insights from the economics of superstars, I develop an efficient method
for estimating the skill of mutual fund managers. Outliers are especially helpful for
disentangling skill from luck when I explicitly model the cross-sectional distribution
of managerial skill using a flexible and realistic function. Forecasted performance is
dramatically improved relative to standard regression estimates: an investor selecting
(avoiding) the best (worst) decile of funds would improve risk-adjusted performance
by 2% (3%) annually. The distribution of skill is found to be fat-tailed and positively
skewed, providing a theoretical explanation for the convexity of fund flows.
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Section 1
Introduction
With over $3 trillion in aggregate assets under management, the scale of the active
mutual fund industry is a testament to the conviction among investors that skilled
managers exist and can be identified in advance. Yet the unpredictability of good
performance remains the principal stylized fact in the mutual fund literature, and is
often interpreted to imply the absence of skill among fund managers and the inability
of investors to benefit from active mutual funds.1 In this paper, I will show that this
“fact” is the consequence of strong, unrealistic, and often implicit assumptions about
the distribution of “alpha”—namely that alphas are independent across funds, or that
alpha is normally distributed. I propose a hierarchical model of investment perfor-
mance that relaxes both assumptions, and I provide empirical support for alternative
“facts”: alphas are predictable, and extreme performance is not always luck.
The assumption that alphas are independent across funds is what justifies any
fund-by-fund approach to performance evaluation.2 Although seemingly reasonable,
Jones and Shanken (2005) show that this is equivalent to assuming, counterfactually,
that the distribution of alphas across managers is known. In the realistic case where
1Berk and Green (2004) propose a model that reconciles unpredictability with the existence of
skill, but all benefits from skill accrue to fund managers rather than their investors.
2Carhart (1997) uses OLS, but more recent methods allow substantially improved inference. See,
e.g., Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2002), Bollen and Busse (2005), and Mamaysky et al. (2007).
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the distribution of alphas is acknowledged to be unknown, the returns of all funds
intuitively help to illuminate the abilities of fund managers as a group, which in turn
enables improved inference for any particular fund. Jones and Shanken present a
hierarchical model that formalizes this cross-sectional “learning across funds”.
They also impose normality on the cross-sectional distribution of alpha, but there
is little evidence that alpha follows this convenient form.3 Rather, it is a modeling
choice intended to improve inference by reducing the influence of outliers. When
extreme alpha estimates are thought to be spurious, reasonable remedies include
shrinkage towards a normal distribution, or still more cautious parameter filters that
simply drop funds with estimated alphas outside some allowable range.4 The surviv-
ing funds’ alphas can be interpreted with greater confidence, but little is learned about
the dropped funds. This is a disadvantage of employing such sharp, and inherently
subjective, parameter filters. But the larger cost of treating outliers as problematic
statistical artifacts is that the extreme alphas might instead be the most interesting
and informative cases—economic rather than statistical outliers.
The “superstars” literature documents convex returns to talent across a range of
disciplines. Rosen (1981) describes the phenomenon: “In certain kinds of economic
activity there is concentration of output among a few individuals, marked skewness
in the associated distributions of income, and very large rewards at the top.” Subse-
quent work explores the pronounced disparities in, for example: CEO compensation,
rock concert revenues, television ratings for NBA games, and citation counts for fi-
3Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) employ distinct bootstrap techniques and
document non-normalities in the alpha distribution. Kosowski et al. find more pronounced non-
normalities than do Fama and French. They also find stronger evidence of positive alphas net of
fees.





falls outside a predefined region.
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nance academics.5 Across diverse fields of endeavor, observed outcomes are distinctly
non-normal and positively skewed, regardless of the distribution of underlying, and
unobservable, talent. Viewed through this lens, extreme alphas are the natural result
of differences in innate investment skill.
This perspective requires some semantic clarification. Alpha is often considered
synonymous with investing skill, but these are distinct concepts. Investment skill
itself—like the related attribute of intelligence—cannot be directly observed, although
it is associated with observable manager characteristics.6 Alpha is a measure of in-
vestment performance, an outcome that we expect to be increasing in managerial skill.
The economics of superstars shows that the mapping between talent and outcomes
is often convex, and that extreme alphas may be the rule rather than the exception.
The approach to performance evaluation in this paper incorporates these insights.7
(For the sake of consistency with the mutual fund literature, alpha and skill are used
interchangeably in the rest of this paper.)
I present a hierarchical model where the cross-sectional distribution of alpha is
described by a mixture-of-normals, and each fund manager represents a draw from
this distribution. The mixture-of-normals is a flexible and realistic modeling choice,
allowing—but not imposing—both skewness and fat tails. The data will dictate
whether these features are present.
Out-of-sample tests reveal significant short-term alpha predictability. The “mix-
ture” alphas are striking improvements over the estimates from OLS, which in turn
outperform alphas from a hierarchical model with a normal cross-sectional distribu-
5These four examples are from Gabaix and Landier (2008), Krueger (2005), Hausman and
Leonard (1997), and Chung and Cox (1990), respectively.
6See, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Cohen et al. (2008), and Coval and Moskowitz (2001)
who relate managerial performance to undergraduate institution quality, social ties to corporate
board members, and geographic proximity, respectively.
7The distinction between alpha and skill is also central to the model of Berk and Green.
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tion: imposing the wrong structure on the cross-section of alpha can be worse than
imposing no structure at all. The bottom decile portfolio of mutual funds formed
using the mixture-of-normals distribution is more than twice as bad as the OLS bot-
tom decile portfolio, while the top “mixture” portfolio is nearly twice as good as the
OLS top portfolio. (The alphas of the top and bottom “mixture” decile portfolios are
+5.4% and -6.1%, respectively.) I find that the true distribution of alpha is fat-tailed
and positively skewed, consistent with the economics of superstars. I also find that
fund flows are sensitive to these “mixture” alphas—evidence that investors respond
to, and benefit from, the skills of mutual fund managers. Finally, I show that the
non-normality of the alpha distribution can help to explain the convexity of fund
flows.8
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the hierarchical
model in detail. Section 3 explains the data used for the analysis. Section 4 presents
the main empirical results. Section 5 provides some robustness checks. Section 6
discusses the results and their relation to the mutual fund literature. Section 7 con-
cludes.
8Fund flows are much more responsive to high performance than to poor performance.
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Section 2
Model
I adopt a hierarchical Bayesian model, similar in spirit to Jones and Shanken (2005),
that allows for skewness and fat-tails in the cross-sectional distribution of managerial
skill. The parameters of this distribution are determined by the data, including
“outliers”. Skill is measured relative to a four-factor model including the Fama and
French (1993) factors and the momentum factor of Carhart (1997). Prior distributions
are weakly informative—proper but diffuse.
2.1 Background
The (semi-strong) efficient markets hypothesis implies that abnormal mutual fund
returns should not persist. Carhart (1997) provides strong supporting evidence: ad-
justing for a momentum factor in addition to the three Fama-French (1993) factors
produces ranked portfolios of mutual funds without significant persistence among top
performing funds. However, Berk and Green (2004) showed that if fund returns are
decreasing functions of assets under management, the absence of persistence in factor-
model skill estimates is not inconsistent with the existence of skill.9 Furthermore,
studies using shorter holding periods than the one-year holding periods employed by
9Berk and Green (2004) also assume rational investor learning in the context of a common-
knowledge prior on the distribution of skill. This is an unrealistic feature of their model.
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Carhart have found evidence of persistence.10 Skill may indeed exist, but it appears
difficult to identify.
Imperfect empirical methodologies may explain the difficulty. Jones and Shanken
(2005) observe that “. . . the maximum OLS alpha estimate [among a population of
funds] becomes unbounded as the number of funds approaches infinity, even when
the true alphas are all zero.”11 Mamaysky et al. (2007) demonstrate that “. . . sorting
on the estimated alphas populates the top and bottom deciles not with the best and
worst funds, but with those having the greatest estimation error.” Carhart’s result
appears less damning upon reconsideration: alpha may seem non-persistent simply
because it is poorly measured.
One “solution” is to drop funds with suspiciously extreme alphas. Another ap-
proach is to use shrinkage estimators.12 Bayesian inference automatically incorporates
shrinkage towards a prior distribution. Inferences are made on all funds, but the ac-
curacy of the posterior estimates depends very strongly on the shape of the prior.
Baks et al. (2001) employ a prior on skill consisting of the right tail of a truncated
normal distribution and a probability mass at the point of truncation. They provide
a procedure for eliciting the parameters of this prior from the investor. Jones and
Shanken use a normal prior on skill but do not specify its mean or variance, instead
estimating these along with all fund-level parameters in a hierarchical procedure.
Both priors are simple, but they do not reflect the richness of the true distribution of
skill.
Kosowski et al. (2006) document a complex non-normal distribution of mutual
fund alphas. They note that “the separation of luck from skill becomes extremely
10See, e.g., Bollen and Busse (2004).
11They assume a standard factor model with independent residuals, as in (2.1).
12See Efron and Morris (1977) for an introduction to shrinkage estimation.
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sensitive to the assumed joint distribution from which the fund alphas are drawn” and
motivate their non-parametric bootstrap approach by invoking the “intractability of
parametrically modeling the joint distribution of mutual fund alphas across several
hundred funds.” This paper tackles the same problem head-on. The prevailing cross-
sectional distribution of skill among mutual fund managers is indeed complex, but it
is not intractable.
2.2 Model specification
Excess fund returns are assumed to follow a standard linear factor structure,
Rjt −Rft = αj + Ftβj + εjt , (2.1)
where εjt ∼ N (0, V jε ), factor loadings βj and residuals εj are cross-sectionally uncor-
related, and the T ×K matrix of factor returns F is observable.
The investor assumes that true manager alphas are independent draws from a
















where N = 2, φ (x) is the standard normal density, µi and Vi are the unknown mean
and variance of mixture component i, and the wi are unknown non-negative weights
that sum to one.13 This conditional distribution of alpha is simple and flexible,
allowing both skewness and excess kurtosis in the cross-section of managerial skill
13Without additional restrictions, the mixture of normals in (2.2) is not identified. An additional
identifying restriction, µ2 ≥ µ1, is imposed without loss of generality to allow estimation. Stephens
(2000) describes the problem in more detail and proposes an alternative resolution.
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but imposing neither.14 It also suggests an intuitive interpretation of the two mixture
components as “good” and “bad” manager types.
Greater flexibility could be achieved at the expense of parsimony. Increasing the
number of normal mixture components is straightforward, although interpretation is
problematic for N ≥ 4. One could alternately employ finite mixtures of Student’s t or
Laplace distributions—imposing excess kurtosis—or a more general unimodal skewed
distribution.15
In the absence of strong justification for any specific alternative distribution, how-
ever, it is reasonable to begin with the simplest choice that allows some variability
in skewness and kurtosis. The distribution in (2.2) fits the bill, while minimizing
computational complexity and the impact of specification searching.
2.3 Bayesian approach
The hierarchical model defined by (2.1) and (2.2) is conceptually simple, yet estima-
tion with classical methods is not feasible. Consider the sheer number of parameters:
for each of the J funds there are K + 2 parameters, in addition to 5 population-level
hyper-parameters.16 For any reasonable values of J and K, the prospects for success-
fully implementing a high-dimensional numerical optimization, as required by MLE
or GMM, are dim.
14The distribution is conditional because it depends on the unknown population hyper-parameters
(µi, Vi, wi) that will be estimated along with the fund-level parameters
(
αj , βj , V jε
)
.
15Ferna´ndez and Steel (1998) describe a general approach to modeling skewed unimodal distribu-
tions in a Bayesian context. Their method allows skewness and kurtosis to vary independently; an
advantage over the simpler model in (2.2). See section 5.2 for an application of their method to this
analysis.
16The K + 2 parameters are the managerial skill and the idiosyncratic variance, in addition to K
factor loadings.
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The Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach to the estimation of Bayesian
models breaks this curse of dimensionality. Rather than dealing directly with a single
intractable [J · (K + 2) + 5]-dimensional joint posterior distribution, we can equiva-
lently work with the [J · (K + 2) + 5] individual 1-dimensional conditional posterior
distributions, which together fully characterize the joint posterior distribution. This
equivalence is guaranteed by the Hammersley-Clifford theorem.17
2.4 Prior specification
A complete Bayesian model requires both likelihoods and priors. The former are
defined by (2.1) and (2.2). The latter are described below.
An ideal prior distribution (i) accurately represents the investor’s prior information
and beliefs while (ii) enabling easy sampling from the posterior distribution. The
second condition is often automatically satisfied by a conjugate prior, which gives
rise to a known analytical posterior distribution from the same family as the prior.
For example, a normal prior and a normal likelihood result in a normal posterior.
Conjugacy is a valuable property, but is not always consistent with (i). In such cases,
I relax (ii) in favor of (i).
A common criticism of Bayesian inference is that the inherently subjective prior
distribution can exert substantial influence on posterior parameter estimates. I min-
imize subjectivity by choosing intentionally uninformative priors. By this, I mean
17See, e.g., Robert and Casella (2004).
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diffuse proper distributions. These are sometimes also called weakly informative pri-
ors to distinguish them from improper priors.18
Putting aside complex approaches to uninformative priors that are themselves
subject to criticism,19 I follow the pragmatic lead of Leamer (1978):
“. . . we can find a prior distribution that will have little impact on
the posterior. It is important to understand that this is not a prior in-
tended to represent ignorance. . . In practice, the sample may dominate
the prior information and the posterior distribution may be inconsequen-
tially different from a posterior distribution corresponding to an improper
[uninformative] prior. A prior density that is relatively uniform where the
likelihood function attains its maximum is likely to imply such a poste-
rior.”20
The priors on µi and each β
j
k are independent normal distributions with means of
zero and large variances, with the exception of βjmkt which has a prior mean of one.
The priors on Vi and V
ε
j are independent gamma distributions with shape parameters
of one and large scale parameters.21 The prior on w = [w1, ..., wN ] is a Dirichlet
distribution with an N × 1 vector of ones as the parameter.22 The prior on αj is
18Any valid probability density must have a finite integral over the relevant parameter space. An
improper prior is a function whose integral is infinite, hence the impropriety. Typical improper priors
would be f (θ) ∝ 1 for a location parameter, or f (σ) ∝ 1σ for a scale parameter. While superficially
appealing, such priors do not always lead to valid posteriors. (See, e.g., Lindley (1972).) They are
not even uninformative. The improper prior f (θ) appears to be uninformative with respect to θ,
but it also suggests that |θ| is extraordinarily large and that 1θ is very close to zero.
19For example, the Jeffreys prior or Zellner’s g-prior.
20pp. 61-63, emphasis added.
21A more common choice would be inverse-gamma distributions, which have the virtue of con-
jugacy. However, these are not consistent with condition (i) or Leamer’s rule of thumb, especially
when the posterior parameter estimates are likely to be close to zero. See Gelman (2006).
22This results in a marginal prior for each wi that is beta distributed with parameters 1 and N−1.
For the degenerate case where N = 2 that is employed here, this is simply the uniform distribution
on the unit interval.
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already defined by (2.2). See Appendix A for a detailed presentation of the prior and
posterior distributions for all model parameters.
2.5 Hierarchical structure
Having specified a complete Bayesian model in some detail, it may seem self-defeating
to select priors that convey no information. Such a view overlooks the importance
of the hierarchical structure of the model. The power of this structure to influence
posterior parameter estimates is not undone by arbitrarily diffuse priors, as long as
they are proper.23 Indeed, the chief justification for choosing diffuse priors is to
ensure that the estimation results are driven by the model itself rather than any
specific choice of priors.
If we altered the model to eliminate (2.2) and estimated (2.1) with diffuse priors,
this would be equivalent to OLS. However, the estimates generated by the full model
are radically different from those given by OLS—these differences must be attributed
to the hierarchical structure itself.
23Improper priors are another story, since they can effectively preclude the cross-sectional learning
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Section 3
Data
Mutual fund data are obtained from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund
Database, which begins in 1961. Monthly returns are net holding period returns—all
estimated alphas are after costs and management fees.24 This takes the perspective
of an investor considering allocating capital to active fund managers, rather than that
of a philosophical investigation of the existence of skill. Alpha only matters to the
extent that it exceeds costs.
Monthly factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s website via WRDS. I
use a four-factor model, consisting of the three Fama-French factors and a momentum
factor, throughout the analysis.
The CRSP data are incomplete in several key ways. Multiple share classes of
a single fund appear as separate funds in CRSP, with no foolproof way of identify-
ing and grouping them. Addressing this shortcoming is especially important in this
analysis, since double-counting funds would impair estimation of the cross-sectional
distribution of skill. Furthermore, CRSP data regarding fund objectives and fund
managers are not comprehensive. Each of these is addressed in turn.
24To reconstruct gross returns, one should add back management expenses and trading costs.
Expense ratios are available for most funds, so these could be added back to the reported net
returns. However, trading costs would need to be estimated in order to compute approximate gross
returns. See, e.g., Wermers (2000) and French (2008).
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3.1 Multiple share classes
The cross-sectional distribution of skill in (2.2) can only be estimated if each fund in
the sample represents a distinct draw from the distribution. Many mutual funds have
multiple share classes, and each class appears in the CRSP database as a separate
fund. To proceed with the analysis, these “funds” need to be identified in order to
avoid double-counting. Unfortunately, there is no explicit share class variable in the
database.
CRSP suggests matching “funds” that share the same portfolio of holdings, but
portfolio data are not available until 1998. The only alternative is to examine man-
agement company and fund names, matching as deemed appropriate. This latter
approach is employed here.
Funds without fund name data are consequently excluded from the analysis. This
affects approximately 10% of the funds at the beginning of the sample in 1961 but
generally disallows less than 5% of all funds.
Fund names of the remaining funds are filtered to remove all non-alphabetic char-
acters and extra spaces. Based on the general pattern that share classes of the same
fund will have the same name followed by a suffix denoting the share class, funds are
then grouped according to their names’ pairwise Levenshtein distances.25 Panel A of
Figure 3.1 shows a histogram of all pairwise Levenshtein distances for the entire sam-
ple of 20,000+ funds. The mode is between 40 and 50, and it appears that very few
pairs of funds have similar names. Panel B of Figure 3.1 shows the same histogram
only for distances less than or equal to 10. Here we can see that there is a secondary
25The Levenshtein distance between two strings is the minimum number of edits needed to trans-
form one string into the other, with the allowable edit operations being insertion, deletion, or
substitution of a single character. See Levenshtein (1966).


































0 20 40 60 80 100
Levenshtein distance




























0 2 4 6 8 10
Levenshtein distance
Panel B: Distance <= 10
Figure 3.1 – Levenshtein distances of all pairs of fund names. Panel A
shows the entire CRSP sample. The mode is quite large – between 40 and
50. Panel B zooms in to show only distances less than or equal to 10, clearly
indicating the presence of a secondary mode at 1.
mode for distances equal to 1. Although most random pairs of funds have names that
are nothing alike, some pairs have names that are nearly identical.
Funds with Levenshtein distances less than 3 are assumed to be share classes of
a single actual fund. From each grouping of fund share classes, the class with the
most assets under management is retained to represent the fund. Figure 3.2 shows
the total number of “funds” in the CRSP database, the number of funds that have
fund name data, and the number of true funds that survive the share class filter.
3.2 Fund objectives
This analysis is confined to actively managed domestic equity mutual funds. Fund
names and Lipper class (where available) are screened to drop money market, bond,
balanced, and international funds. Index funds are identified by screening fund names
for explicit references to indexing. Closet indexers cannot be identified in this way,
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Figure 3.2 – Number of funds in the sample before and after the share
class filter. Essentially all funds have fund names recorded in the database
(dashed line), but the majority do not survive the share class filter (dotted
line).
and any such funds remain in the sample. This corresponds to the challenge faced by
investors in prospectively identifying closet indexers. Furthermore, such funds will in
general have estimated alphas close to zero, less their trading costs and management
fees. They are unlikely to populate the highest or lowest deciles of ranked mutual
funds, which are the basis of the key results of this study.
3.3 Fund managers
Data on fund managers in the CRSP database are not comprehensive. No manager
name data is available before 1998. Even after 1998, in many cases, the fund manager
field is missing or recorded as team.26 Utilizing individual fund manager data is
26Massa et al. (2010) discuss why fund management companies may elect to have anonymously
managed funds.
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Figure 3.3 – Effect of requiring fund manager information on sample size.
The solid line represents the fund sample used in the rest of the analysis.
The sudden jump in the number of funds in 2007 corresponds to a change
in the data sources used by CRSP.
therefore not feasible without impoverishing the sample. The full impact of requiring
individual manager data is depicted in Figure 3.3.
One consequence of the lack of reliable manager data is that the funds themselves
become the objects of analysis. Ideally, when a fund changes its portfolio manager, the
new prior on its alpha would depend on the new manager’s previous fund’s returns.
Since the data do not allow managers to be tracked in this way, I use funds’ returns as
if no management changes have occurred.27 This does not introduce any bias but does
weaken the model’s predictive ability for funds that have changed managers during
the evaluation period.
27This approach assumes fund returns are generated according to (2.1) and depend only on the
fund manager. If the fund family makes a difference, then future returns are related to past returns
even after a managerial change. Brown and Wu (2011) estimate such a model in a Bayesian setting.
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Section 4
Results
For each month, alphas are estimated for all funds with at least 12 monthly obser-
vations during the 2-year window [t− 23, t]. Funds are evaluated using each of three
methods: OLS, hierarchical Bayes with a mixture-of-normals prior, and hierarchical
Bayes with a “standard” normal prior.28 All funds are ranked according to their esti-
mated alphas and assigned to deciles. Funds that are missing during month t+ 2 are
dropped; equally-weighted portfolios are formed from the remaining funds.29 These
portfolios are held for one month and then rebalanced according to the updated alpha
estimates.
Following Busse and Irvine (2006), the alpha of each of these decile portfolios is
estimated using standard OLS regressions. When estimating the alpha of a portfolio
of funds, there is likely to be little difference between the OLS measure and any
reasonable Bayesian measure based on the same model. Using the OLS post-ranking-
period measure avoids any bias that could result from using the Bayesian measure
for both the ranking-period and the post-ranking-period.
28This last method follows Jones and Shanken (2005) and allows a direct assessment of the value
of using a sufficiently flexible prior distribution.
29A one-month gap is introduced between the ranking-period and the post-ranking-period to
eliminate spurious microstructure-induced correlations.
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4.1 Parameters of the mixture-of-normals distribution
Posterior means and 95% confidence intervals of the parameters in (2.2) are shown in
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. Each rolling estimation window is 24 months long, so the
estimates depicted for month t correspond to fund performance during the window
[t− 23, t].
Figure 4.1 shows posterior estimates of both mixture component means, µ1 and
µ2, and the weight on the second mixture component, w2. By construction, and with-
out loss of generality, the mean of the second component is greater than or equal to
the mean of the first component. Panel A shows that µ1 is generally indistinguishable
from zero, although it does diverge from zero towards the end of the sample – posi-
tively during the very early 2000s and negatively since then. Panel B shows that µ2
follows a pattern similar to µ1, essentially always statistically equal to zero. Panel C
shows that the proportion of managers drawn from the second, high skill, component
has always been low and has steadily decreased over time – falling from 20% at the
start of the sample to 10% at the end.
Figure 4.2 shows posterior estimates of the standard deviations of both mixture
components. Far more managers are drawn from the first component, so the confi-
dence intervals on
√
V1 are much tighter than those on
√
V2. Nevertheless, it is clear
that
√
V2 is an order of magnitude larger than
√
V1.
The overall distribution has substantial excess kurtosis because the individual
variances are unequal; in this case V2  V1. This, plus the fact that µ2 > µ1 gives
rise to positive skewness as well. Both findings are consistent with the economics of
superstars.
Although one virtue of the mixture-of-normals distribution was the potentially
straightforward interpretation of the components as good and bad manager types,
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the high dispersion of the second mixture component suggests a similar but more
nuanced interpretation. Managers with extremely high or low relative alphas are
likely to be drawn from the second mixture component, consistent with positively
correlated alpha and risk-taking: managers drawn from this high-alpha, high-variance
component are taking aggressive risks that pay off on average but that expose their
funds to significant losses.
4.2 Comparison of skill distribution moments, by prior
Posterior moments of the distribution of skill for all three “priors” are shown in
Figure 4.3.30 Moments for both hierarchical Bayes priors—normal and mixture-of-
normals—are computed directly from their posterior parameter estimates. Moments
for the OLS distribution are computed from the estimated fund alphas.
Panel A compares the estimated means of the prevailing distribution of skill from
OLS and the mixture model. The estimated mean from the normal hierarchical model
is nearly identical to that of the mixture model and is not depicted. The posterior
mean from the mixture model behaves as we might expect: it generally follows the
OLS mean but shrinkage mitigates the larger fluctuations.
Panel B compares the estimated standard deviations of the prevailing distribu-
tion of skill. The susceptibility of OLS to the influence of outliers is clear. The
normal hierarchical model generates the lowest estimates—shrinkage in its strongest
form. In between lies the estimated standard deviation from the mixture hierarchical
30OLS may not be an explicit Bayesian prior, but OLS estimates will exactly match Bayesian
estimates if the priors are dogmatically diffuse; e.g. normal distributions with infinite variances.
If such strictly uninformative, improper priors are specified, there can be no shrinkage and the
posterior alpha estimates will depend only on the likelihood. Thus, Bayesian estimation would yield
the maximum-likelihood estimates for a regression model such as (2.1), which are equivalent to the
OLS estimates.
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Panel C: Weight on Mixture Component 2
Figure 4.1 – Rolling posterior estimates and 95% confidence intervals for
the means of both mixture components and the weight on the second mixture
component in (2.2). The mean of the second component is constrained to
be higher than the mean of the second component.
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Panel B: Mixture Component 2 Standard Deviation
Figure 4.2 – Rolling posterior estimates and 95% confidence intervals for
the standard deviations of both mixture components in (2.2).
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model. This model is flexible enough to take account of extreme alphas without being
dominated by them.
Panel C compares the estimated skewness of the prevailing distribution of skill
from OLS and the mixture model. The normal model, of course, is constrained
to have zero skewness. OLS cannot decide whether skill is positively or negatively
skewed. Indeed, the series is so volatile and the excursions from zero are so large (in
both directions) that it cannot possibly correspond to reality. The mixture model
produces relatively stable and comprehensible estimates of mild positive skewness.
Panel D tells a similar story via the kurtosis estimates. The normal model is
constrained to have a kurtosis of three, while both OLS and the mixture model
“agree” that kurtosis is likely to be much higher—although they diverge regarding
how much higher. Here is clear evidence that the default Bayesian approach, with
a normal prior on alpha, over-shrinks the estimated alphas in this case. Fitting to
a normal distribution assumes away large outliers, while a more flexible model can
learn from them.
4.3 Estimated cross-sectional distribution of alpha
The moments of the distribution of alpha are revelatory, but the distribution itself
completes the story. The overall distribution of skill is shown in Figure 4.4. This view
makes the distribution appear normal, but the pivotal deviations from normality are
in the tails.
Understanding the tail behavior requires an examination of the individual mixture
components. Both components, scaled to reflect their relative weights, are shown in
Figure 4.5. The two components differ dramatically in terms of relative weighting and
dispersion. Component 1 represents approximately 85% of all managers and requires
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Figure 4.4 – Overall estimated cross-sectional distribution of alpha from
2004, summing the individual components shown in Figure 4.5. Alpha is
monthly and measured in percent. The distribution appears generally nor-
mal in this zoomed-out view, since the weight on mixture component 1 is
much larger than the weight on mixture component 2. A closer examination
of the tails, depicted in Figure 4.6, reveals pronounced non-normality.
that alpha is fairly close to zero. Component 2, representing the remaining 15% of
fund managers, allows for extreme alphas in both directions.
Figure 4.6 illustrates this extreme tail behavior. Although component 1 assigns
approximately zero probability to alphas larger than 0.6% monthly, component 2
assigns small positive probabilities to alphas as high as 3% monthly. Relative to
a normal model of alpha, which completely discounts the possibility of “superstar”
fund managers capable of dramatic outperformance, the mixture-of-normals allows
the upper echelon of managers to exhibit superior alphas.
4.4 Decile portfolio performance
Decile portfolios are formed using all three ranking methods and their abnormal
returns are estimated using OLS. The power of the mixture-of-normals prior is made
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Figure 4.5 – Estimated mixture components from 2004, chosen to be repre-
sentative. Component 1 is depicted by the solid line, while the higher-mean
component 2 is depicted by the dashed line. Alpha is monthly and measured
in percent. Component 2 has a slightly higher mean and a much higher vari-
ance than component 1.













Figure 4.6 – Tail behavior in the cross-sectional distribution of alpha from
2004—a zoomed-in view of the distributions in Figure 4.5. Component 1 is
depicted by the solid line, while the higher-mean component 2 is depicted by
the dashed line. Alpha is monthly and measured in percent. The probability
of observing extremely high alphas is several orders of magnitude higher than
it would be in a model that imposed normality on alpha, a result of allowing
for the second component.
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clear in this test. Numerical results are given in Table 4.1 and shown graphically in
Figure 4.7.
Even OLS reveals substantial short-term predictability. The worst funds (deciles
1 and 2) continue to under-perform and the best funds (deciles 9 and 10) continue
to outperform. Carhart documented persistent poor performance over a longer time
frame, attributing it to high fees. Bollen and Busse, among others, have more recently
documented persistent outperformance in the short term using OLS. Thus, the results
from the OLS decile portfolios are just as expected.
Results using rankings from the normal hierarchical model are telling—they are
substantially weaker than those from OLS. The performance of the bottom decile
portfolio is better than the OLS bottom decile portfolio, and the performance of the
top decile is worse. The normal prior does a worse job of sorting funds. There is
valuable information in the extreme alpha estimates that the normal model is forced
to disregard.
The results from the mixture hierarchical model are striking: all portfolios have
statistically significant alphas, decile 1 under-performs OLS decile 1 by 30 basis points
and decile 10 outperforms OLS decile 10 by 18 basis points. When annualized, these
translate to 360 basis points and 216 basis points, respectively. The differences relative
to the normal hierarchical estimates are even starker. In absolute terms, the mixture
decile 1 portfolio posts an annual alpha of -6.1% and the mixture decile 10 portfolio
posts an annual alpha of +5.4% during the fifty-year period 1961-2010. The mixture
bottom decile portfolio is more than twice as bad as the OLS bottom decile portfolio,
while the mixture top decile portfolio is nearly twice as good as the OLS top decile
portfolio.
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Out-of-Sample Monthly Alphas
of Decile Portfolios
Decile OLS Normal Prior Mixture Prior
1 -0.21* -0.14* -0.51*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
2 -0.12* -0.16* -0.37*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3 -0.07 -0.09* -0.34*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4 -0.05 -0.07 -0.18*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
5 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
6 0.00 0.04 0.25*
(0.03) (0.08) (0.05)
7 0.03 0.08 0.25*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
8 0.06 0.06 0.32*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
9 0.10* 0.15* 0.36*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
10 0.27* 0.15* 0.45*
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Table 4.1 – Out-of-sample monthly alphas of decile portfolios by ranking
method, 1961-2010. At the end of each month t, alphas are estimated for each
mutual fund using each method and the past 24 monthly returns. Funds are
ranked, and equally-weighted decile portfolios are formed and held during
month t + 2. Alphas for these portfolios are estimated using OLS, with
bootstrapped standard errors.
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Figure 4.7 – Out-of-sample OLS alphas and 95% confidence intervals for
decile portfolios, by ranking method, 1961-2010. Data are taken from Table
4.1. Panel A shows decile portfolios formed from funds ranked on their
OLS alphas. Panel B shows decile portfolios formed from funds ranked on
their hierarchical Bayes alphas with a normal prior. Panel C shows decile
portfolios formed from funds ranked on their hierarchical Bayes alphas with
a mixture-of-normals prior.
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4.5 Fund-by-fund alpha correlations
The mixture model generates superior portfolios of funds; its fund-level estimates
are better as well. Using the same two-year estimation windows, we can compare
the estimated fund alphas for the interval [t− 23, t] to the estimated alphas for the
non-overlapping interval [t+ 2, t+ 25].31 Let the vector of estimated fund alphas













Funds that do not appear in both intervals are dropped before the correlation is com-
puted. I expect that the typical fund used in this part of the analysis is consequently
better than average. Even if the level of alpha is biased upwards, this does not imply
that the serial correlation is biased.
When comparing the performance of two models, k1 and k2, in predicting the
estimates generated by model k3, it is also useful to define:
k1,k3∆k2,k3t = ρ
k1,k3
t − ρk2,k3t . (4.2)
Results are shown in Table 4.2.32 From the first three columns in Panel A, we
see that all alphas are positively serially correlated, consistent with the predictability
suggested by the performance of the decile portfolios. The last two columns show the
correlations of alphas generated by the hierarchical models in the first period with
31By evaluating the estimation methods in this way, I assume that the short-term predictability
in fund alphas is not completely offset by any un-modeled longer-term negative correlation.
32The same analysis was also performed using rank correlations with essentially identical results.
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0.141* 0.116* 0.171* 0.104* 0.159*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)






Table 4.2 – In Panel A, serial correlations of estimated fund alphas are
computed for rolling, non-overlapping, two-year intervals, 1961-2010. In the
last two columns, the hierarchical models are used to predict OLS alphas.
In Panel B, differences in these correlations are reported.
the OLS alphas from the second period. These are positive as well, and indicate that
the positive serial correlations are not artifacts of the Bayesian procedure.
Panel B of Table 4.2 shows the differences in the correlations. In the second
column, we can see that the mixture model’s estimates are indeed more strongly
serially correlated than the OLS estimates. Most critically, the third column shows
that the mixture model predicts the OLS estimates better than OLS itself.




One issue with the mutual fund data from CRSP is the incubation bias discussed in
Evans (2010): “Mutual fund incubation is a strategy that some fund families use to
develop new fund offerings. In incubation, families open multiple new funds, often
with a limited amount of capital. At the end of an evaluation period, some funds are
opened to the public, while the others are shut down before investors ever become
aware of them. . . The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allows fund families
to advertise the incubation-period performance of these funds.”
Thus, the apparent outperformance of young funds is largely the result of selection
bias rather than managerial skill. To estimate the magnitude of the effect, Evans
separates incubation-period returns from post-incubation-period returns by using the
date when each fund’s ticker was created. The creation of a ticker indicates that a
fund will soon be sold to the public, and proxies for the end of incubation. When
only post-incubation-period returns are considered, young funds no longer outperform
older funds.
Ideally, this ticker creation date filter could be applied to the fund returns data
before the rest of the analysis in this paper. Unfortunately I do not have ticker
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creation data from the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). As a cruder
approximate approach, Evans also proposes an age filter that discards the first 36
months of each fund’s returns.33 Although many valid data are lost, the data that
remain are incubation bias free.
To check whether incubation is driving the results presented in this paper, I repeat
the portfolio formation described in Section 4 using only funds with complete return
histories during the window [t− 59, t− 24]. That is, funds need 36 months of returns
prior to the ranking period [t− 23, t].
OLS alphas for these portfolios are presented in Table 5.1, and graphically in
Figure 5.1. There are no material differences between these alphas and those in the
main analysis (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.7), indicating that incubation is not driving
the main results of this paper.
5.2 Alternative Alpha Distribution
The finite mixture of normals defined in (2.2) was chosen because it is a simple,
flexible, and familiar distribution that allows for both skewness and excess kurtosis
while imposing neither. To check that the main results are not simply artifacts of
this particular modeling choice, I re-estimate an alternative model that retains the
standard return generating process in (2.1) but replaces the mixture of normals in
(2.2) with the generalized unimodal distribution of Ferna´ndez and Steel (1998).






























33See Table VIII in Evans (2010) for a complete comparison of the ticker creation date filter and
the cruder age filter.
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Out-of-Sample Monthly Alphas of Decile
Portfolios After Age Filter
Decile OLS Normal Prior Mixture Prior
1 -0.22* -0.16* -0.49*
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
2 -0.11* -0.17* -0.38*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3 -0.06 -0.08 -0.31*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
4 -0.05 -0.08* -0.20*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
5 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
6 -0.01 0.00 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
7 0.02 0.06 0.25*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
8 0.05 0.06 0.30*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
9 0.11* 0.10* 0.31*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
10 0.23* 0.16* 0.45*
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Table 5.1 – Out-of-sample monthly alphas of decile portfolios, after age
filter, by ranking method, 1967-2010. At the end of each month t, alphas
are estimated for each mutual fund using each method and the past 24
monthly returns—only for funds with a complete return history during the
window [t-59, t]. Funds are ranked, and equally-weighted decile portfolios
are formed and held during month t + 2. Alphas for these portfolios are
estimated using OLS, with bootstrapped standard errors. There is virtually
no difference between the estimates here and those from the main analysis
presented in Table 4.1, indicating that the main results are not attributable
to the incubation bias of Evans (2010).
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Figure 5.1 – Out-of-sample OLS alphas and 95% confidence intervals for
decile portfolios, after applying age filter, by ranking method, 1967-2010.
Data are taken from Table 5.1. There are no significant differences in per-
formance between these portfolios, formed using the age filter suggested in
Evans (2010), and the original portfolios shown in Figure 4.7, indicating that
incubation bias does not drive the results in this paper.
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and γ > 0 is a skewness parameter. Values of γ greater than one result in positive
skewness, while values less than one result in negative skewness. Location parameter
µ and scale parameter
√
V have their usual interpretations. This distribution has
only four parameters, one fewer than (2.2), while allowing skewness and kurtosis to
vary independently. However, the distribution is unimodal by construction. Note
than when γ = 1, (5.1) simplifies to the Student’s t-distribution, which in turn nests
the normal distribution.
Figure 5.2 depicts the influence of the skewness parameter γ. Setting γ = 1
results in a symmetric density, while increasing γ increases skewness. The mode of
the distribution is fixed at µ. Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between positively and
negatively skewed densities. Holding other parameters fixed, setting γ′ = 1
γ
reflects
the original density with respect to µ. Appendix B provides analytical expressions
for the moments of this distribution. For details on the MCMC sampling algorithm,
please refer to Ferna´ndez and Steel (1998).
Estimating alphas using this distribution rather than the finite mixture of normals
and forming decile portfolios as in Section 4 produces the results shown in Table 5.2
and depicted graphically in Figure 5.4. For ease of comparison, the earlier results
(using the mixture of normals prior on alpha) are reproduced. Although different in
minor details, the portfolios formed using the alternative alpha distribution perform
very similarly to the portfolios formed using the mixture prior on alpha. The ability of
the hierarchical model to accurately measure—and predict—alphas does not depend
on the particular distribution used to model alpha.
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Figure 5.2 – Family of curves generated by (5.1), showing symmetric Stu-
dent’s t-distribution (γ = 1) and two positively skewed counterparts (γ = 2,
γ = 3). In all cases, µ = 0, V = 1, and ν = 6.












Figure 5.3 – Pair of curves generated by (5.1), showing positively skewed
distribution (γ = 2) and its negatively skewed mirror image (γ = 12). In
both cases, µ = 0, V = 1, and ν = 6. In general, p(α − µ|µ, V, γ, ν) =
p(−(α−µ)|µ, V, 1γ , ν), i.e. taking the reciprocal of γ reflects the density with
respect to µ.
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Out-of-Sample Monthly Alphas
of Decile Portfolios





















Table 5.2 – Out-of-sample monthly alphas of decile portfolios formed using
alternative alpha distribution, 1963-2010. At the end of each month t, alphas
are estimated for each mutual fund using each method and the past 24
monthly returns. Funds are ranked, and equally-weighted decile portfolios
are formed and held during month t + 2. Alphas for these portfolios are
estimated using OLS, with bootstrapped standard errors. Values for the
mixture prior are taken from Table 4.1. There are no material differences
between these two sets of estimates, indicating that the main results are not
sensitive to the particular distribution used to model the cross-section of
alpha.
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Panel B: Generalized Unimodal Distribution
Figure 5.4 – Out-of-sample monthly alphas of decile portfolios formed us-
ing alternative alpha distribution, 1963-2010. Data are taken from Table
5.2. Although different in minor details, the portfolios formed using the al-
ternative alpha distribution perform very similarly to the portfolios formed
using the mixture prior on alpha. The ability of the hierarchical model to
accurately measure—and predict—alphas does not depend on the particular
distribution used to model alpha.
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5.3 Non-normal Idiosyncratic Errors
One assumption embedded in (2.1) is that the idiosyncratic errors in fund returns
are normally distributed. It is worthwhile to examine the validity of this assumption.
Although the out-of-sample portfolio performance in Section 4.4 is robust to any mis-
specification of the error distribution, the estimated moments of the cross-sectional
distribution of alpha, shown in Figure 4.3, are influenced by modeling choices with
respect to error distributions.34
If true idiosyncratic errors are skewed, then the residuals from (2.1) will also
be skewed. The main estimations from Section 4 imposed only the condition of




t −Rft )− α̂j − F tβ̂j, (5.3)



















For each month t, we can examine the distribution of skew(ej[t−23,t]) across all funds
j. If true errors are normal, we would expect this distribution to be very concentrated
near zero. In a finite sample, we will always observe non-zero residual skewness,
regardless of the true distribution. Our principal concern, however, is whether the
pronounced positive skewness in the cross-sectional distribution of alpha, as depicted
34Section 4 presented findings of skewed and fat-tailed alphas, conditional on normally distributed
errors. If the errors themselves are skewed and fat-tailed, while true alphas are not, the estimated
alphas may still exhibit the skewness and excess kurtosis shown in Figure 4.3 — spuriously inheriting
their distribution from the true errors.
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in Panel C of Figure 4.3, could have been inherited from a positively skewed error
distribution.
Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of skew(ej[t−23,t]) for nine consecutive, non-
overlapping 24-month intervals. In all cases, there is no indication that residuals tend
to be positively skewed. If anything, some of the histograms show a tendency towards
negative skewness. These diagnostic plots suggest that the (strong) assumption of
normal idiosyncratic errors is not driving the cross-sectional estimates in Figure 4.3,
and strengthen the evidence for positive skewness of true managerial alphas.
To completely account for possibly non-normal idiosyncratic errors, the model in
(2.1) could be expanded. Instead of assuming that errors are normal, we could instead
assume that they are drawn from the generalized unimodal distribution of Ferna´ndez
and Steel (1998), described in Section 5.2.35
5.4 Alternative Ranking Rules
In the main analysis, funds are ranked according to their alpha point estimates.
As noted by Mamaysky et al. (2007), this approach to fund sorting may populate
the extreme decile portfolios with funds with the most imprecisely estimated alphas,
rather than with the truly best and worst funds. Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and
French (2010) propose sorting on the t-statistics of the estimated alphas, rather than
the alphas themselves, to exploit the superior statistical properties of the t-statistic.
To check that the decile portfolios formed using OLS estimates are not being
unfairly handicapped by the choice of any specific ranking rule, I repeat the main
analysis after sorting on funds’ t-statistics. For the Bayesian hierarchical estimates
35Care would need to be taken to correctly impose the zero-mean condition, however, since the
parameter µ in their distribution represents the mode, not the mean. Moreover, some valid com-
binations of the distribution parameters (µ, V, γ, ν) lead to distributions with infinite means. See
Appendix B.
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Figure 5.5 – Histograms of fund-level residual skewness, computed accord-
ing to (5.3) and (5.4), for nine non-overlapping 24-month intervals, 1992-
2009. There is no evidence that residuals are generally positively skewed.
Thus, the positive skewness of alphas in Figure 4.3 cannot be attributed to
any un-modeled non-normality of idiosyncratic errors.
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, where T is the number of return observations for fund j.
As before, ranked funds are grouped into equally-weighted decile portfolios, and
these portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Alphas for these portfolios are estimated
using OLS. The results are reported in Table 5.3. For comparison, the main results
with portfolios formed by ranking funds on α̂j are showin in Table 4.1.
The change in sort variable did not materially affect the Bayesian portfolios. Pos-
terior distributions of α̂j automatically account for noisy data by placing relatively
more emphasis on the prior—distributions with means of zero in this case.36 If the
data for a particular fund j are especially noisy, α̂j will tend towards zero as well, i.e.
it will be more likely to be assigned to deciles 5 or 6, not deciles 1 or 10.
The OLS portfolios also performed almost identically, despite the change in sort
variable. Although t-statistics are, in general, better behaved than simple point
estimates, it is clear that the main results of presented here do not depend on the
choice of sort variable.
5.5 Alternative Performance Measures
5.5.1 Decile Portfolio Performance
To check that the results are not linked to a specific performance measure — the four-
factor alpha used in the main analysis — I compute mean excess returns and Sharpe
ratios for the decile portfolios. Even though the funds are still ranked according to
α̂j and grouped into decile portfolios accordingly, these portfolios are now evaluated
using two simple alternative performance measures.
36See Section A.3.
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Out-of-Sample Monthly Alphas of Decile
Portfolios Sorted on t-Statistics
Decile OLS Normal Prior Mixture Prior
1 -0.22* -0.19* -0.51*
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
2 -0.11* -0.10* -0.37*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
3 -0.06 -0.11* -0.34*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4 -0.05 -0.02 -0.18*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
5 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
6 0.01 0.02 0.12*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
7 0.00 0.08 0.25*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
8 0.09* 0.06 0.32*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
9 0.08* 0.14* 0.36*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
10 0.26* 0.14* 0.45*
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Table 5.3 – Out-of-sample monthly alphas of decile portfolios sorted on
t-statistics, by ranking method, 1963-2010. At the end of each month t,
alphas are estimated for each mutual fund using each method and the past
24 monthly returns—only for funds with a complete return history during
the window [t-59, t]. Funds are ranked according to the t-statistics of their
estimated alphas—as opposed to the alpha point estimates—and equally-
weighted decile portfolios are formed and held during month t + 2. Alphas
for these portfolios are estimated using OLS, with bootstrapped standard
errors. There is virtually no difference between the estimates here and those
from the main analysis in Table 4.1.
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Mean excess portfolio returns are shown in Table 5.4. Excess returns are calculated
with respect to the risk-free rate. Portfolios formed using the Bayesian mixture
α̂j exhibit a mean excess return that is strictly increasing in decile order, with a
difference (decile 10 - decile 1) of 1.23% per month. Portfolios formed using OLS α̂j
also produce monotonically increasing mean excess returns, although the difference
between extreme deciles is only 0.47% per month.
Portfolio Sharpe ratios are shown in Table 5.5. Again, performance is strictly
increasing in decile rank for both Bayesian mixture and OLS portfolios. But the
difference between extreme deciles (decile 10 - decile 1) is 0.87 for the mixture prior,
while it is only 0.29 for OLS.
The results using these two alternative performance metrics is entirely consistent
with the main results using four-factor alphas. I can’t rule out the possibility that
using additional and/or different factors might erode or even reverse the results.
Nevertheless, the strength of these results suggests that the main results in Section 4
are robust to reasonable alternative performance measures.
5.5.2 Fund-Level Return Predictability
In addition to evaluating decile portfolio performance, we can also consider alternative
measures of fund-level predictability. Section 4.5 showed that the estimated alphas
were predictable across non-overlapping 2-year periods. We can also evaluate fund
return predictability.
Using monthly data as in Section 4, estimate fund alphas and factor loadings for
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Mean Excess Monthly Returns of
Decile Portfolios, in percentage terms
Decile OLS Normal Prior Mixture Prior
1 0.28 0.28 -0.12
(0.21) (0.19) (0.20)
2 0.35 0.28 0.13
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
3 0.36 0.36 0.15
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
4 0.37 0.38 0.31
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
5 0.39* 0.44* 0.35
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
6 0.42* 0.49* 0.50*
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
7 0.46* 0.52* 0.55*
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
8 0.49* 0.51* 0.68*
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
9 0.56* 0.61* 0.77*
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
10 0.75* 0.55* 1.11*
(0.23) (0.19) (0.21)
Table 5.4 – Mean excess returns of decile portfolios, by ranking method,
1963-2010. Returns are in excess of the risk-free rate. For comparison, the
mean monthly return of the Fama-French market factor, mktrf, was 0.40%
over the same period.
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Annualized Sharpe Ratios of
Decile Portfolios
Decile OLS Normal Prior Mixture Prior
1 0.19 0.22 -0.09
2 0.26 0.21 0.10
3 0.28 0.27 0.11
4 0.29 0.28 0.24
5 0.31 0.32 0.26
6 0.32 0.36 0.37
7 0.35 0.38 0.41
8 0.37 0.37 0.49
9 0.40 0.44 0.55
10 0.48 0.42 0.78
Table 5.5 – Annualized Sharpe ratios of decile portfolios, by ranking
method, 1963-2010. Returns are in excess of the risk-free rate. For compar-
ison, the annualized Sharpe ratio of the Fama-French market factor, mktrf,
was 0.30 over the same period.
under the assumption of constant factor loadings. For each month t, compute the
correlation of predicted returns, R˜jt , and realized returns, R
j






where k indicates how the fund parameters were estimated; either OLS or the mixture




t − ρOLSt . (5.7)
Since higher correlations indicate stronger predictability, positive δt indicates that the
mixture model predicts returns better than does OLS.
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Figure 5.6 – Scatterplot showing monthly ρmixturet versus ρ
OLS
t , 1963-2010.
The 45◦ line is shown for reference. Nearly all the data points lie above the
line, indicating systematically higher correlations between realized returns
and Bayesian mixture predicted returns, than between realized returns and
OLS predicted returns.
Figure 5.6 shows a scatterplot of ρmixturet versus ρ
OLS
t for the period 1963-2010.
Each data point represents one month of data. Across the entire time sample, nearly
all of the data lie above the reference 45◦ line: the Bayesian mixture estimates predict
returns much better than do the OLS estimates. This result is robust to any poten-
tial mis-specification of the return generating process in (2.1), as we are predicting
observed returns, not estimated alphas.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the distribution of the correlation gap, δt, as defined in (5.7).
Panel A shows a histogram of the correlation gap. The mean of the distribution is
clearly positive, and almost none of the mass lies below zero. In almost every period,
the Bayesian mixture estimates outperform the OLS estimates. Panel B shows the
same series graphed as a function of time. The outperformance, as evidenced by
positive δt, is a consistent feature across the entire time sample.
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Panel B: Correlation Gap over Time
Figure 5.7 – Distribution of correlation gap, δt, as defined in (5.7), 1963-
2010. Panel A shows a histogram of the monthly observations, clearly indi-
cating a positive mean and very little mass below zero. Panel B shows δt
over time, illustrating that the Bayesian mixture estimates outperform OLS
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Section 6
Implications
The persistent performance of the decile portfolios is impossible to fully reconcile
with the rational model of Berk and Green (2004). In their model, managers can pos-
sess investing skill but do not exhibit persistent non-zero alphas due to convexities
in the costs of managing their funds. As funds grow in size, positive alpha becomes
increasingly difficult to generate. In equilibrium all funds have zero alphas in ex-
pectation, but vary in size according to their managers’ varying levels of skill. This
equilibrium requires investors to evaluate managers in the context of a known cross-
sectional distribution of alpha, and to dynamically re-allocate capital across funds in
each period.
In contrast to the equilibrium predictions of Berk and Green, I find markedly
persistent performance in the short-term. At least one of their assumptions must not
hold. Costs may not be convex. Reuter and Zitzewitz (2010) use fund flows associated
with discrete changes in Morningstar fund ratings to show that their effect on fund
performance is inconsistent with the Berk and Green hypothesis. There may be
frictions associated with capital re-allocation that prevent investors from responding
immediately to new estimates of manager skill.
The most indisputable deviation from the Berk and Green world, however, is that
investors do not know the true cross-sectional distribution of alpha. In reality, as
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in the model presented here, this distribution and the individual fund alphas must
be estimated simultaneously. Such an analysis requires MCMC methods—somewhat
beyond the capabilities of the typical mutual fund investor, or even the typical finan-
cial advisor. The sheer difficulty of the evaluation is sufficient to cause slow learning,
even among competent and vigilant investors. Even if all of the other assumptions of
Berk and Green hold, this slow learning implies the short-term persistence of alphas
that I document.
Flow predictability regressions presented below show that investors do respond to
the information contained in the Bayesian mixture alphas. Whatever heuristics they
employ to evaluate funds must incorporate the intuition of my model if not its details.
6.1 Convexity of fund flows
Fund flows have a convex relationship with past fund performance. Outflows in re-
sponse to poor performance are less pronounced than the inflows in response to good
performance.37 Lynch and Musto (2003) offer an explanation: if poor performance
makes changes in investment strategy more likely, then poor performance is less infor-
mative than good performance regarding future returns. Berk and Green (2004) also
predict a convex flow-performance relationship—a consequence of the convex costs of
management in their model.38
Another possibility is that the optimal updating rule for posterior skill estimates
is itself convex. While a normal prior (along with a normal likelihood) gives rise to a
linear updating rule, the mixture prior proposed here generates an updating rule that
37See, e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997).
38See Figure 3 in Berk and Green (2004).
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is nonlinear for observed returns that are not extremely far from zero, and convex
over the region of greatest interest.39
Assume that the true cross-sectional distribution of skill is a mixture-of-normals,
as in (2.2). For comparison, I also consider a normal prior on skill. To obtain the
best approximation, the mean and variance of the normal prior are set to match the
mean and variance of the mixture distribution:
µ = (1− w2) · µ1 + w2 · µ2 (6.1)
and
V = (1− w2) · V1 + w2 · V2 + w2 · (1− w2) · (µ1 − µ2)2 . (6.2)
Assume that fund returns are simply managerial skill plus Gaussian disturbances: a
simplified version of the model in (2.1) with no risk factors.
After observing a single return R, investors update their estimates of managerial




















































39The details depend on the model parameters, but the intuition is that extreme observations are
almost certainly drawn from the mixture component with the highest variance. Since this component
is normal, the updating rule has a linear asymptote.
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Figure 6.1 – Updating rules for managerial skill with a mixture-of-normals
prior (dashed line) and a normal prior with matching first and second mo-
ments (solid line). R is a monthly return measured in percent. The parame-
ters of the mixture distribution are: µ1 = −1, µ2 = 0, V1 = 0.01, V2 = 1, and
w2 = 0.1. Plugging these into (6.1) and (6.2), we get the following param-
eters for the “matching” normal distribution: µ = −0.9 and V = 0.2. The
updating rule for the normal prior is linear. The updating rule for the mix-
ture prior has a linear asymptote but is nonlinear for non-extreme returns,
and is generally convex for monthly returns between -4 and +4 percent.
To make this more concrete, the posterior expectations, (6.3) and (6.4), of alpha
corresponding to each of these priors after a single return R are shown in Figure
6.1. Here we can easily see how sensitive the posterior beliefs are to the investor’s
prior, even when both possible priors have matching first and second moments. The
updating rule for the mixture prior is generally convex for non-extreme monthly
returns. If the relationship between skill estimates and observed returns is convex,
and the relationship between fund flows and skill estimates is not too concave, we
should expect to observe convex flows.
The mixture-of-normals prior is not special in this regard. Any non-normal prior
will generate a nonlinear updating rule. A more flexible prior than the two-component
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mixture should be able to match the observed flow-performance relationship even
more closely.
6.2 Predictability of fund flows
This paper describes a method of accurately estimating mutual fund alphas that fully
exploits the information contained in the cross-section of funds. It is natural to ask
what resemblance this bears to the methods investors actually use to evaluate funds.
Although their methods are not observable, investors’ conclusions are revealed by the
fund flow data.
Results for a series of fund flow predictability regressions are shown in Tables 6.1
and 6.2. The dependent variable is the flow ratio, defined as the net fund flow divided
by the fund’s total assets under management in the previous month. Regression (1)
is patterned after the baseline regression model of Sirri and Tufano (1998). This
shows that investors are highly responsive to past returns, although they are more
responsive to high returns than to low returns—the effect of being in the top quintile of
past returns is positive and significant even after controlling for average past returns,
Rt −Rmkt. This convexity is a robust feature of mutual fund flows.
Regression (2) adds the lagged OLS alpha as a predictor, while regression (3) adds
the lagged Bayesian mixture alpha. Regression (4) includes them both. Regression
(2) shows that investors are indeed responsive to the information in OLS alphas.
This information does not subsume the effect of past returns, but the coefficient on
Rt −Rmkt is somewhat closer to zero. Regression (3) shows that investors are also
responsive to the information in Bayesian mixture alphas.
In regression (4), we see that both the OLS alphas and the Bayesian mixture
alphas predict fund flows in a statistically significant manner. Although the point
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estimate of the coefficient on the Bayesian mixture alpha is higher than that of the
OLS alpha, 0.33 versus 0.11, this difference is not significant. The key finding is that
the information contained in the Bayesian mixture alphas, incorporating knowledge
of the skewness and excess kurtosis in the cross-sectional distribution of alpha, influ-
ences investors’ capital allocations, beyond the information contained in OLS alphas
and directly in past returns. Although not statistically significant, it also appears
that including the Bayesian mixture alphas, in regressions (3) and (4), decreases the
convexity of fund flows, consistent with the theoretical predictions of section 6.1.
Table 6.2 shows a set of related regressions where the lagged estimation residual
from (2.1) is among the independent variables. By explicitly controlling for this “luck”
component of returns as well as the “skill” component α̂, we can examine investors’
sensitivity to these components of returns.40 If investors were entirely rational, they
would ignore the “luck” component of returns, but this is not what we find.
Regressions (6) and (7) show fund flow sensitivity to α̂ and residuals from, re-
spectively, OLS and Bayesian estimations. In both cases, investors respond very
strongly to estimated residuals, even though this “luck” component is not persistent
by construction. In the case of OLS estimates, the sensitivity to “luck” is an order
of manitude larger than putative “skill” — α̂, while for the Bayesian estimates the
sensitivities are nearly identical.
40Systematic risk exposure through non-zero factor loadings also contributes to returns, but this
component is not correlated with the “skill” and “luck” components and therefore doesn’t need to
be included as a regressor.
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Fund Flow Predictability
Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Flow Ratio (1) (2) (3) (4)
Top Return Quintile 0.62* 0.50* 0.38* 0.43*
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Bottom Return Quintile 0.10 0.21 0.26 0.39
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.27)
Rt −Rmkt (%) 2.45* 1.99* 2.14* 2.16*
(0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.35)
σ(Rt −Rmkt) (%) -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Lagged Expense Ratio (%) -0.15 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Total Flow into Fund Category ($M) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lagged Log(Assets Under Mgmt. ($M)) 0.36* -0.38* -0.38* -0.37*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Lagged OLS α̂ (%) 0.13* 0.11*
(0.02) (0.05)
Lagged Bayesian Mixture α̂ (%) 0.65* 0.33*
(0.06) (0.14)
Constant 0.95 1.35* 1.67* 1.40*
(0.56) (0.58) (0.60) (0.64)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
Table 6.1 – Results for Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting flow ratio,
defined as this month’s net flows divided by last month’s total assets under
management; 1963-2010. Regression (1) is based directly on the baseline
regression in Sirri and Tufano (1998), and shows both the responsiveness
of flows to raw past performance, as well as the convexity of fund flows.
(2) adds OLS alphas as a predictor, while (3) adds the Bayesian mixture
alphas. (4) includes both alphas as predictors. Although overall R2 does
not change dramatically, the strongly significant coefficients on the Bayesian
mixture alphas indicate that they contain information not contained in the
other predictors, and that investors are sensitive to this information.
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Fund Flow Predictability with “Skill” and “Luck” Decomposition
Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Flow Ratio (5) (6) (7)
Top Return Quintile 2.18* 1.36* 1.45*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Bottom Return Quintile -1.66* -0.92* -1.05*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
σ(Rt −Rmkt) (%) 0.03* -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Lagged Expense Ratio (%) -0.06 -0.02 -0.02
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Total Flow into Fund Category ($M) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lagged Log(Assets Under Mgmt. ($M)) -0.35* -0.39* -0.40*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Lagged OLS α̂ (%) 1.41*
(0.30)
Lagged OLS “Luck” (%) 14.46*
(3.61)
Lagged Bayesian Mixture α̂ (%) 16.80*
(3.98)
Lagged Bayesian Mixture “Luck” (%) 15.90*
(4.00)
Constant 2.13* 2.64* 3.07*
(0.26) (0.25) (0.26)
R2 0.07 0.10 0.09
Table 6.2 – Results for Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting flow ratio
using “skill” and “luck” decomposition; 1963-2010. Regression (5) presents a
baseline model similar to regression (1) in Table 6.1 except that mean excess
return has been removed as a predictor. Regresssion (6) adds both OLS α̂ —
“skill” — and the previous month’s estimation residual from equation (2.1)
— “luck”. Regression (7) does the same for the Bayesian “skill” and “luck”
components.
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6.3 Smart money effect
A general finding in the literature is that mutual fund flows help to predict mutual
fund performance.41 The “smart money” effect refers to the interpretation that in-
vestors are actually able to anticipate future fund performance and allocate capital
accordingly, but this is not the only interpretation.42 One way to assess the “smart-
ness” of investors is to examine the incremental impact that estimated alphas have
for fund return prediction, controlling for fund flows.
Table 6.3 presents estimates from a series of regressions seeking to explain fund
returns in terms of past flows and returns. Regression (3) shows that past flows do
predict fund returns; adding past returns in regression (4) weakens the predictive
power of flows. As expected, regressions (1) and (2) show that including lagged OLS
and Bayesian mixture alphas does improve fund return prediction.
The most interesting results are from regression (4), which includes past flows
and both OLS and Bayesian mixture alphas. The coefficient on lagged flow ratio re-
mains significant—flows are predictive beyond the information contained in estimated
alphas. Had the coefficients on lagged flows all been insignificant, this would have
implied that alphas predict fund returns because both are driven by managerial skill:
flows are truly smart money. The failure of this test does not imply that investors are
not smart, however, since this is a joint test of the accuracy of the estimated alphas
and the smart money effect. But the strength of the return predictability documented
in section 4.4 and the relative weakness of the flow predictability documented in sec-
tion 6.2 suggest a mechanism other than “smart money” for the predictability of fund
returns by fund flows.
41See, e.g., Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999).
42For example, Lou (2011) presents evidence that fund return predictability is the consequence of
flow-induced price pressure on underlying stock holdings.
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“Smart Money” Effect, Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Monthly Fund Return (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged OLS α̂ (%) 0.19* -0.15*
(0.01) (0.01)
Lagged Bayesian Mixture α̂ (%) 0.11* 0.11*
(0.01) (0.01)
Rt −Rmkt (%) 0.24* 0.17*
(0.01) (0.01)
Flow Ratio in month t−1 0.002* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Flow Ratio in month t−2 0.001* 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Flow Ratio in month t−3 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.45* 0.53* 0.49* 0.38* 0.49*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Table 6.3 – Results for Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting monthly fund
returns; 1963-2010. (1) and (2) show the predictive power of OLS and
Bayesian mixture alphas, respectively. (3) shows that flows do help to pre-
dict fund performance. They continue to predict performance when (4) past
returns are included, and (5) when OLS and Bayesian mixture alphas are
included. This evidence, combined with the results from sections 4.4 and
6.2, suggests that “smart money” is not the principal mechanism explaining
why fund flows predict fund returns.
Also noteworthy is the coefficient on lagged OLS alphas in regression (5): it is neg-
ative and significant. Controlling for Bayesian mixture alphas, future fund returns are
higher when OLS alphas are lower, and vice versa. This is a clear illustration of how
poorly OLS distinguishes signal from noise in the context of investment performance
evaluation.
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Figure 6.2 – Estimated fraction of managers with positive alpha using the
Bayesian mixture model.
6.4 Value of active management
Even if some fund managers possess skill, investors do not benefit unless managers
generate positive alpha after management fees and trading costs. Since all alphas
in this study are estimated using net fund returns to the investor, we can directly
evaluate the prevalence of skill over time. Panel A of Figure 4.3 shows the overall
mean of the prevailing distribution of skill—it does not diverge substantially from the
implied OLS mean—which seems to lend support to the Berk and Green hypothesis:
the typical fund has an alpha quite close to zero.
Looking at the mean alone is misleading, however. Figure 4.4 shows that the pre-
vailing distribution of skill also has fat tails and positive skewness. Instead of simply
examining the mean, it is more informative to compute the fraction of managers with
positive alpha directly from the estimated parameters of the prevailing cross-sectional
distribution. The results are shown in Figure 6.2.
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Barras et al. (2010) classify funds as either unskilled, zero-alpha, or skilled, and
find that 75% of funds are zero-alpha while less than 5% are skilled.43 This paper
uses fund-level data to estimate the underlying distribution—sharply separating the
negative and positive regions of skill. There is no need for a zero-alpha category
unless there is a point mass at zero in the underlying skill distribution. Kosowski et
al. (2006) use a bootstrap approach to compute a continuous measure of skill, and
find that approximately 5% of managers show evidence of skill net of costs.
The most recent estimates in Figure 6.2 suggest that approximately 20% of man-
agers have skill, although the fraction has been much higher in the past. The volatility
of the estimates over time and the magnitude of the maximum estimates rightly sug-
gest that the distribution has not been perfectly estimated. Nevertheless, the decile
portfolios performed well: an imperfectly estimated distribution still greatly assists
in the proper ordering of funds.
Even if sizeable fractions of managers possess skill after costs and fees, we would
like to know if the active mutual fund industry is providing value in aggregate. Fama
and French (2010) employ a bootstrap methodology and find that the aggregate
portfolio of mutual funds has a negative net alpha, although there is evidence of
superior skill in the extreme upper tail of the cross-sectional distribution of skill.
This study used only one representative share class from each fund. To construct
a comparable net industry-wide alpha, we would need to take into account all share
classes of each fund, their expense ratios, and assets under management, following
French (2008). This has not been done, so the important question of whether the
industry provides value to investors remains open. Even still, it is safe to speculate
43See Figure 4 in Barras et al. (2010) for a comparison to Figure 6.2. Their estimated fraction of
skill is both much lower and smoother than the estimates presented here.
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that such an analysis would have conclusions somewhat more favorable to the mutual
fund industry than French, given the higher fraction of skilled managers found here.
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Section 7
Conclusion
The model explored in this paper is deliberately kept simple to focus attention on the
sensitivity of alpha estimates to the assumptions made regarding the cross-section of
skill. Existing methodologies ignore the conclusions of the “superstars” literature: the
returns to investing skill are likely to be positively skewed and fat-tailed. An optimal
approach to performance evaluation should take this into account and explicitly model
the cross-sectional distribution of alpha accordingly.
The hierarchical model I propose is such an approach. While it does not impose
skewness or excess kurtosis, it “learns” from the data that such features are indeed
present. Despite the simplicity of the mixture-of-normals distribution, the resulting
estimates for fund alphas exhibit strong predictability across the entire population of
funds—it is not merely the very best and the very worst funds whose performance
persists.
In addition to accurately measuring fund alphas, this model also provides a pos-
sible explanation for the convexity of fund flows. Any non-normal prior on the dis-
tribution of alpha will lead to a nonlinear updating rule: high observed returns can
exert much greater influence than low observed returns on the posterior mean of a
given fund’s alpha. The convexity of fund flows could thus be a rational response to




APPENDIX A. MCMC ALGORITHM: MIXTURE OF NORMALS 67
Appendix A
MCMC Algorithm: Mixture of Normals
This section provides details about the Bayesian inference procedure, including the
priors on all parameters and a step-by-step summary of the Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithm used to generate samples from the joint posterior distribution of
the parameters when alphas are assumed to be draw from a finite mixture of normals.
A.1 Parameters to be estimated
(





for i = 1, ..., N ; j = 1, ..., J ; k = 1, ..., K; where N is the number
of mixture components in (2.2), J is the number of funds, and K is the number of
risk factors in (2.1).
A.2 Latent indicator
To simplify the estimation procedure, I introduce a latent J × 1 vector z, where each
element is Bernoulli distributed,44
zj ∼ Bernoulli (w2) . (A.1)
44In the general case with more than two mixture components, zj is categorically distributed with
vector parameter w.
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The conditional (on zj) prior on skill is now normal, instead of the original mixture
of normals in (2.2):
αj ∼ N (µzj+1, Vzj+1) . (A.2)
A.3 Priors
All priors are proper but diffuse. They are scaled to correspond to the monthly
percent returns used in the analysis. For example, an annual alpha of 12% would
appear here as 1.
µ1 ∼ N
(







apriorµ = 0, A
prior
µ = 10
) · 1µ2≥µ1 (A.4)























V jε ∼ Gamma (1, 5) (A.9)
A.4 Sampling algorithm
1. Draw z conditional on w, µi, Vi, α.
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• Draw z ∼ Bernoulli (p2).
2. Partition α conditional on z.
• Partition α into two vectors, α1 and α2, corresponding to those elements
of α from each of the mixture components, and let Ni = rows(αi).
3. Draw Vi conditional on z, µi, αi.
• Because of the gamma prior, the posterior on Vi is not a known distribution
and is sampled using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings draw.
4. Draw µi conditional on Vi, αi.




























5. Impose identifying constraint µ2 ≥ µ1.
• If the most recent draws of µi violate this constraint, revert to the previous
values.
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6. Draw w conditional on z.
• Compute posterior vector hyper-parameter:






• Draw w ∼ Dirichlet (piposterior).
7. Draw V jε conditional on R
j, F, αj, βj.
• Because of the gamma prior, the posterior on V jε is not a known distribu-
tion and is sampled using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings draw.
8. Draw βj conditional on Rj, F, αj, V jε




















k ·Rj − αj ·
T∑
t=1
Fk,t − F ′k · F−k · β−k
V jε
(A.16)







9. Draw αj conditional on zj, µzj+1, Vzj+1, β
j, V jε , F, R
j.
























• Draw αj ∼ N (aposteriorα,j , Aposteriorα,j ).
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Appendix B
Moments of the Generalized Unimodal Dis-
tribution
The mode of the generalized unimodal distribution of Ferna´ndez and Steel (1998) in
(5.1) is µ. To better understand this distribution, it is helpful to examine its moments
as well.
Equation (5.1) generates a finite r th order moment if and only if the corresponding
moment of the underlying Student’s t-distribution exists. In general, the r th central
moment of (5.1) is given by
















The skewness of the distribution in (5.1) is given by
Skew(αj|γ) = (γ − 1
γ
) · (M3 + 2M
3
1 − 3M1M2)(γ2 + 1γ2 ) + 3M1M2 − 4M31
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